Response: The active shooter quagmire

By Tom Carey, TheKlaxon.com

Columbine, Virginia Tech and most recently the Fort Hood massacres have left police departments across America struggling to decide on what proper response protocols and tactics should be deployed in active shooter cases.

These questions have stirred debate among police officials for the better part of a decade as the public continues to demand immediate actions by police.

However, each incident is dynamic. There are no “cookie-cutter” molds that can be used for every situation.

Responding to an “active shooter” situation is the ultimate quagmire for responding officers: Do they wait or do they rush in?

Some law enforcement executives believe the job should be left up to the Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) or Emergency Service Units (ESU). Ideally, these units have the most training, correct weaponry (patrol rifles or shotguns), better equipment and the proper mindset. They would appear to be a practical solution to this ever-changing problem.

However, the problem lies in waiting for these special units to respond when officers are already present at the scene.

‘Stopwatch of Death’
To illustrate this point, law enforcement consultant Ron Borsch created a model to compress shooting incidents in order to find a tactical solution to this growing problem. Borsch calls it “The Stopwatch of Death.”

The Stopwatch provides a reliable unit of measurement to determine the scale of one active shooter incident relative to another (Number of murder attempts / Number of minutes = X).

His formula is based on the number of murder attempts over the number of casualties (either killed or injured by a bullet) and divides that number of minutes within which the shooting takes place.

A proponent of Borsch’s model is Lt. Colonel Dave Grossman, a West Point psychology and military science professor, who claims the model points can save lives.

“At a minimum, one officer can delay and disrupt the killer, as in the recent Salt Lake City mall shooting,” he said.

This was seen when Department of Defense Police Sgt. Kimberly Munley and Senior Sgt. Mark Todd intervened by firing at alleged Fort Hood shooter Maj. Nadal Hasan until he was taken into custody by Todd.

Recently, in New York City’s Times Square area, New York City Police Department Sgt. Christopher Newsom was fired upon with a MAC 10 machine gun when he attempted to place the suspect under arrest.

The perpetrator, Raymond Martinez, fired twice before his gun jammed, which allowed the Newsom an opportunity to incapacitate him.

This incident could have been much worse, as the perpetrator had an additional 27 bullets in the magazine.

Shooter Preparedness
As we analyze these incidents and apply Borsch’s model, we learn that the perpetrators of mass violence are extremely prepared. In the Columbine massacre, students Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris carefully planned their violent event by identifying locations where students would congregate in mass.

They did this to improve their kill ratio. These individuals noted that there would be approximately 500 students present in the high school’s cafeteria after the first lunch period.

According to Jennifer Rosenberg in her article “Columbine Massacre,” “They planned to plant propane bombs in the cafeteria timed to explode at 11:17 and then shoot any survivors as they came running out.”

Fortunately, the bombs failed to explode. However, Klebold and Harris had set up a decoy bomb, which exploded several blocks from the school, diverting police resources away from school grounds.

At about this time, these individuals began their rampage by firing indiscriminately at students and throwing small bombs and Molotov cocktails. They then returned to the school cafeteria and attempted to detonate a 20-pound bomb, but failed.

The rampage finally ended when Klebold and Harris shot themselves.

We were horrified by the actions of Hasan at a military processing center at Fort Hood, Texas.

He was able to shoot and kill 13, injured an additional 30 soldiers and two civilian police officers. Hasan not only received quality marksmanship training given to him by the U.S. Army, but executive-level planning and operations classes as well.

Since he was stationed at Fort Hood, Hasan was familiar with the processing center and the Army installation. He knew that the Military Police patrols would be spread thin throughout one of the the Army’s largest installations. He also knew his fellow soldiers would be unarmed. He also counted on the fact that there would be virtually no security measures at the Soldier Readiness Center.

Hasan, like Dylan and Klebold were insiders.

Are You Going In?
Time is of the essence when dealing with an “active shooter” situation.

The days of setting up a perimeter to contain the situation and wait for SWAT, ERT or ESU are over.

I have to agree with Dave Spaulding’s article, that going in to deal with the active shooter situation is a personal choice especially in a suburban or rural area.

I learned long ago from the Army’s value system that Selfless Service isn’t just another value in today’s military but a way of life. This value is prevalent in the law enforcement community as well.

No one knows for sure how they will react when called upon to do so. It’s just part of the job. As a result, using the selfless service value smartly can save lives.

One additional point that needs to be addressed is when and if these situations change from an active shooter type incident to a hostage barricade.

To effectively deal with this type of situation would require a management decision to shift tactics to isolate and containment and await the response of SWAT and properly trained hostage negotiators.

If patrol personnel are securing a door or an area in the inner perimeter, they should be immediately relieved by SWAT upon their arrival and be redeployed to the outer perimeter for support functions (security, traffic, media control, etc.).

Louis J. Rapoli, a consultant with Peregrine Training Services, contributed to this report.